Although several cases of fire outbreaks in the past have been recorded, the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire was among the most catastrophic and deadliest events in Kentucky and the United States as a whole. The fire, which is reported to have begun at around 8:30 p.m. on May 28, 1977, killed and injured 165 and 200 people, respectively (Staff report, 2017; “Beverly Hills Supper Club,” n.d). Apart from the lost lives, the fire also led to massive destruction of properties, which had earlier been renovated and redesigned. While Beverly Hills Supper Club fire was an uncertain occurrence, the impact and outcomes were exacerbated by inadequate fire protection and life safety features, such as automatic sprinklers, fire detection and alarm system, insufficient egress points, and an overlook of the duties of the fire prevention personnel.
Description of the Building
The Beverly Hills Supper Club was a Class A place of assembly. Based on reports issued by the NFPA, the club was an irregularly shaped building of approximately 240 feet by 260 feet (Best, 1978). The building lacked a clear layout that could be followed during an evacuation in instances of a disaster. In addition, the club had an unprotected, noncombustible construction (Best, 1978). The report also showed that the building had two major exit points located in the canopy, while the north exit was situated at the Garden rooms, as shown in figure 1. (Best, 1978). Furthermore, the NFPA investigation revealed that the width of the main exit points was equal to five units, a seemingly smaller path for the club’s exit point (Best, 1978). From the analysis, the Beverly Hills Supper Club building was relatively below the standards of a Class A assembly.
Figure 1.
Source: Best, R. (1978). Beverly Hills Supper club fire. Fire Journal, 72(1), 18-22.
Fire and Safety Features in the Building
Although the Beverly Hills Supper Club held a large capacity of people, the facility had limited fire protection and life safety features. According to NFPA, the only fire protection equipment at the club were five portable fire extinguishers (Best, 1978). Besides, the building had some fire exits, many of which were either locked or unknown by the guest and patrons (Elliot, 1996). Unfortunately, the majority of essential safety features were missing. For instance, NFPA observed that the club lacked sprinklers, fire detection, and alarm systems (Best, 1978). The Beverly Hills Supper club had limited egress points and inadequate fire protection equipment, indicating that the building’s safety features were insufficient.
Based on the analysis of the Beverly Hills Supper Club’s building, it is likely that the absence of sufficient fire and safety features affected the impact and outcome of the fire. In particular, lack of fire detection and alarm system may have been the reason the fire continued for minutes before it was detected, causing many deaths at the facility. Notably, in one of his accounts, one of the survivors recalls that although he was notified of a fire in the Zebra room, he had not noticed the incident while in the room (Elliott, 1996). Hence, if the fire detection system were operational, the staff and other people in the club could have detected the fire early enough to prevent the damages to the property and loss of lives.
Furthermore, the lack of an automatic sprinkler may have affected the outcome of the event. As observed in other similar events, fire spreads rapidly through non-sprinklered parts of a building (Solomon, 2016). Similarly, the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire may have spread speedily from the Zebra room to other parts of the building due to the lack of a sprinkler. Scholars argue that automatic sprinklers detect and suppress the fire before it reaches uncontrollable levels (Kodur, Kumar & Rafi, 2019). Unfortunately, the club lacked the sprinkler system, which may have made it difficult to suppress the fire and minimize injuries and deaths caused by the event.
Furthermore, insufficient exit points in the building may have accounted for the several deaths and injuries that befell its occupants. As observed by NFPA investigators, the Beverly Hills Supper Club had only two major exit points, yet at the time of the fire, the facility hosted approximately 2,400 to 2,800 people (Best, 1978). Hence, the number of egress points may not have been enough to allow the evacuation of guests. Besides, if evacuation was successfully done through the exit points, it would have taken longer due to limitations in the capacity of people that could leave at a time. The design of the building appears to have been non-compliant with the Life Safety Code, which requires each structure to have sufficient exit units for people in the event of emergencies, such as fire and other risks (Best, 1978). For this reason, insufficient egress points may have slowed down the evacuation process during the event of the fire, leading to multiple deaths and injuries of the club’s occupants.
Apart from the lack of essential fire protection and life safety features, overlooking the duties by fire prevention personnel may have affected the outcome of the event. Based on findings from the investigation conducted by the NFPA, it was discovered that the Beverly Hills Supper Club staff delayed notifying the fire department. Rather than reporting the matter immediately, the staff made attempts to fight the fire (Best, 1978). Although the fire control department was able to respond promptly, postponement of the alert may have compromised efforts by the fire prevention personnel to suppress the fire in good time and prevent the outcomes.
Effects of the Event on Attitudes, Laws, Codes, and Standards regarding Fire Protection
While the Beverly Hills fire greatly affected occupants and owners of the building, the event also impacted fire and building codes and standards. After the incident, several amendments were made to codes and standards that governed the designing of old and new structures and fire protection safety features. For instance, additional restrictions on construction were introduced in the Building Construction and Safety Code. Notably, egress inspection was made a requirement before the opening of a facility for business (Duval, n.d). The Beverly Hills Supper Club fire raised awareness among policymakers on the faulty exit units in the majority of the buildings. Hence, an inspection of egress points and other restrictions related to the building were made part of the requirements to prevent similar occurrences.
Besides, the event triggered significant changes in the life safety code. In particular, automatic sprinklers were made a requirement for existing nightclub-type assembly occupancies with occupant loads of over 100 (Duval, n.d). Such a decision by the NFPA may have been influenced by the realization that Beverly Hills Supper Club operated without a sprinkler, thus posing a threat to its occupants during the event of the fire. Therefore, to prevent similar occurrences in other facilities, the NFPA safety code was amended to incorporate sprinklers as requirements in assembly occupancies.
Furthermore, the event affected the fire regulatory association’s attitude towards the tactic of assembling people in the event of a fire. From the accounts of the Beverly Hills fire survivors, it was clear that most facilities lacked trained personnel to guide people to safety units in the event of a fire or other emergencies. Notably, this would explain the reason the majority of the guests in the Beverly Hills Supper club were stranded when the fire began (Elliott, 1996). The event led to a change of attitude towards leadership during catastrophic occurrences, thus influencing the incorporation of additional provisions of crowd managers in the fire codes and standards to ease the process of assembling people in the event of hazardous situations such as fires.
Overall, outcomes of the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire were mainly affected by the nature of the facility and the inefficiency of the fire protection and life safety features in the building. The facility had insufficient egress points, which may have limited the rate of evacuation, resulting in multiple deaths and injuries. Similarly, the absence of a sprinkler and a fire alarm system may have limited early detection and response to the fire, causing severe destructions that would have been prevented if the incident was noticed early. In addition, the outcomes of the event were affected when the staff attempted to fight the fire instead of sending an alert to the fire department, an exercise that was a clear overlook of the duties of the fire prevention personnel. The Beverly Hills Supper Club fire initiated changes in attitude, codes, and standards regarding safety, which included requirements for egress inspection, sprinklers in nightclub-type assembly occupancies, and provisions for crowd managers.
References
“Beverly hills supper club fire: Introduction” (N.d). Illinois Library. Retrieved from https://guides.library.illinois.edu/c.php?g=348303&p=2346974
“NFPA 101: Life safety code” (N.d). National Fire Protection Association. Retrieved from https://www.nfpa.org/codes-and-standards/all-codes-and-standards/list-of-codes-and-standards/detail?code=101
Best, R. (1978). Beverly Hills Supper club fire. Fire Journal, 72(1), 18-22.
Duval, R. (N.d). NFPA case study: Nightclub fires. NFPA. Retrieved from https://www.nfpa.org/~/media/files/news-and-research/resources/fire-investigations/case_study_nightclub_fires.pdf?la=en
Elliott, R. (1996). Inside the Beverly Hills Supper club fire. Turner Publishing Company.
Kodur, V., Kumar, P., & Rafi, M. (2019). Fire hazard in buildings: Review, assessment and strategies for improving fire safety. PSU Research Review, 1(1), 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1108/PRR-12-2018-0033
Solomon, R. (2016, November 1). Is this a sprinkler success? NFPA. Retrieved from https://www.nfpa.org/News-and-Research/Publications-and-media/NFPA-Journal/2016/November-December-2016/Features/Sprinkler-Systems
Staff Report (2017, May 26). Dayton Daily News. Retrieved from https://www.daytondailynews.com/news/years-ago-one-the-country-most-disastrous-club-fires-killed-dozens-from-the-miami-valley/IU4KFfa3VxAWM4RfDax37N/